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Immigration and the Canadian Welfare State 2011
Summary
This publication provides an estimate of the fiscal burden created by recent 
immigration into Canada and proposes reforms to existing immigrant selec-
tion policies to eliminate the burden. It uses a 2006 Census database to esti-
mate the average incomes and taxes paid on these by immigrants who arrived 
in Canada over the period from 1987 to 2004. It also estimates other taxes 
they paid and the value of government services they absorbed.
The study concludes that in the fiscal year 2005/06 the immigrants on aver-
age received an excess of $6,051 in benefits over taxes paid. Depending on 
assumptions about the number of recent immigrants in Canada, the fiscal 
burden in that year is estimated to be between $23.6 billion and $16.3 billion. 
These estimates are not changed by the consideration of other alleged benefits 
brought by immigrants.
To curtail this growing fiscal burden from immigration, the study proposes 
that temporary work visas be granted to applicants who have a valid offer for 
employment from employers, in occupations and at pay levels specified by 
the federal government and determined in cooperation with private-sector 
employers. Immediate dependents may accompany successful applicants. 
The temporary visas are renewable and lead to landed immigrant status if 
certain specified employment criteria are met.
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Highlights
Nearly a quarter of a million immigrants have entered Canada annually during 
the last two decades. The effects that these immigrants have had on economic 
and social conditions in Canada have been considered by Grubel (2005). He 
estimated that as a result of the immigrants’ low average incomes and the 
operation of the welfare state with its progressive income taxes and universal 
social benefits, in 2000 immigrants received from all Canadians an annual net 
fiscal transfer of $18.3 billion. The main objective of this study is to improve on 
Grubel’s calculations using previously unavailable official income and tax data 
referring to immigrants that arrived over a different and longer period. The 
study used data from the 2006 Census (2006 Census Public Use Microdata File 
[PUMF]) that contains information on 844,476 individuals. This sample rep-
resents 2.7% of the Canadian population and allows making statistically valid 
generalizations for the entire population.
Calculating the net fiscal cost of recent immigration
In the year 20051 the immigrants in the Census database, who arrived in 
Canada over the period of 18 years from 1987 to 2004, had an average income 
of $25,396, on which they paid an average of $3,438 in income taxes. The 
comparable figures for all Canadians were $35,057 for income and $5,995 for 
taxes, based on the entire sample of individuals. The data thus implies that, 
on average, immigrants’ incomes were only 72.4% of income earned by all 
Canadians and that they paid only 57.3% of taxes.
The study also took account of other taxes paid by immigrants and 
Canadians, such as sales and property taxes. It found that immigrants on 
average paid $10,340 while all Canadians paid $16,501 in income and other 
taxes. The study also considered the amount received as government bene-
fits by the average immigrant and all Canadians, concluding that immigrants 
received $110 less in benefits than all Canadians. The combination of average 
tax payments and benefits received resulted in the basic finding of the paper: 
in the 2005/06 fiscal year, the average net fiscal transfer per immigrant came 
to $6,051 due to the $6,161 less taxes paid and $110 less in benefits received 
by the average immigrant compared with the averages of all Canadians.
Assuming that an average immigrant pays taxes and receives benefits 
for 45 years between his or her arrival and end of life, this basic estimate 
 1 Calendar year 2005 overlaps the 2005/06 fiscal year. Both 2005 and 2005/06 are used 
in this publication because the census data is for calendar year 2005 and the fiscal data 
is for fiscal year 2005/06.
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implies that each immigrant receives, on average, net benefits worth $272,295. 
It also implies that the 3.9 million immigrants who arrived between 1987 
and 2004 received, in fiscal year 2005/2006, net benefits worth $23.6 bil-
lion. However, after adjusting the number of immigrants for emigration and 
mortality, the number of immigrants receiving the net benefits falls to 2.7 mil-
lion and the estimates of the total net benefits is reduced to the $16.3 billion.
These figures should be seen in relation to some program spending 
by the federal government. Thus, in the 2005/06 fiscal year the $23.6 billion 
transfer to immigrants equals 4.7% of total program spending of $503 billion, 
and comes to 1.18 times the cost of general government services of $20 bil-
lion and 1.79 times spending on the environment of $13.2 billion. Using the 
lower estimate of $16.3 billion for the transfers, they represent 3.2%, 82%, and 
123% of the three selected federal government spending figures, respectively.
Other benefits and costs of immigration 
The study also examines popular propositions about benefits provided by 
immigrants for Canadians that are not reflected in the fiscal estimates. The 
analysis concludes that none of these propositions hold up to close scrutiny. 
It is said that the offspring of immigrants will repay Canadians for the 
fiscal transfers received by their parents and grandparents, but they would 
do so only if, persistently and on average, they have incomes and pay taxes 
much above the average of all Canadians. This outcome is unlikely given that 
the offspring of immigrants in the past eventually have taken on all of the 
characteristics of the average Canadian.
Immigrants are believed to solve the problems of unfunded liabilities of 
Canada’s social programs. However, according to careful studies by actuaries, 
immigrants arriving in acceptable numbers cannot do so, simply and mainly 
because immigrants age and also receive the costly benefits. 
Immigrants do fill jobs that Canadians do not want and thus benefit 
the economy but, in the absence of immigration, these jobs would pay higher 
wages and would be filled by Canadians or eliminated by the application of 
labour-saving technology. Under these conditions, poverty in Canada would 
be reduced substantially. 
Immigrants raise aggregate national income but do not in the process 
increase per-capita incomes of all Canadians. In fact, as the study shows, 
they lower per-capita incomes after taxes, the most important measure of 
economic well-being.
Policy proposals
The paper presents a proposal for immigration reform that is aimed at the 
elimination of the fiscal burden imposed on Canadians through current poli-
cies. The principle for reform is that the number and composition of immi-
grants should be determined largely by market forces within a framework set 
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and managed by government. Under the proposal, the overall immigration 
levels could increase, decrease, or remain unchanged, but would most likely 
decline significantly. 
The proposed system for selecting immigrants is based on the model 
that underlies the present NAFTA rules, which allows the free flow between 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States of workers who hold valid contracts 
for employment in the country of immigration and for a specified list of 
occupations. Under the proposed policy, persons entering Canada with such 
contracts and their dependants would be eligible to become immigrants in 
the traditional sense and ultimately to acquire citizenship after remaining 
employed for a number of years. The role of the government would be to set 
rules for the qualification of applicants, evaluate their health and security 
risks, and ensure that employment is maintained and that violators of rules 
are deported. 
The implementation in practice of policies for immigrant selection 
based on these principles requires a large set of detailed rules, regulations, 
safeguards and standards, the design of which should be undertaken only 
after intensive public consultation and input by experts. The paper consid-
ers a small number of such rules but is designed mainly to stimulate discus-
sion about the proposed selection principles and the practicality of detailed 
implementation measures.
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Introduction
Nearly a quarter of a million immigrants have entered Canada annually during 
the last two decades. The effects that these immigrants have had on economic 
and social conditions in Canada have been considered in a number of papers 
and conference volumes that have been published by the Fraser Institute (e.g., 
Grubel, 2005, 2009). In particular, the study by Grubel (2005: 19) analyzed 
the economic effects of Canadian immigration. He estimated that, as a result 
of the immigrants’ low average incomes and the operation of the welfare state 
with its progressive income taxes and universal social benefits, immigrant 
who arrived between 1990 and 2002 received from all Canadians an annual 
fiscal transfer of $18.3 billion in 2002. Grubel’s study had to use a number of 
assumptions about magnitudes for which no official data was available and 
admittedly provided only a rough ballpark estimate.
The present publication replaces some of these assumptions with more 
comprehensive statistical data from the 2006 Census (Statistics Canada, 2009), 
thus making the estimates more reliable and precise. Moreover, it includes 
data for immigrants who arrived after 2002 and during years from 1987 to 
1989, for whom data was either not available or not used in the study of 2005. 
At the outset, the reader should be warned that this paper has a very specific 
focus and does not analyze a wide range of social and security problems sur-
rounding Canada’s present immigration and refugee policies. These issues 
are discussed in conference volumes edited by Moens and Collacott (2008) 
and Grubel (2009), which contain chapters by experts working in several 
social-science disciplines.
Outline
Section 1 presents data on personal income taxes paid by recent immigrants 
and all Canadians in the sample and gives estimates of the amount of other 
taxes paid by the two groups. Section 2 considers the difference in the value 
of government services consumed by immigrants and all Canadians. Section 3 
presents the fiscal costs imposed by immigrants by bringing together the 
estimates calculated in the preceding sections of tax paid and government 
benefits consumed. Section 4 summarizes arguments about non-fiscal bene-
fits and costs of immigration, which are relevant to assessing the fiscal issues 
in a broader economic context. 
Section 5 presents a proposal for a fundamental reform of the existing 
immigrant-selection policies, which is derived from our findings on the high 
fiscal costs of the present selection policies. The policies proposed are not 
opposed to immigration but rather are intended to replace the judgement of 
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civil servants on who is to be admitted into Canada with judgements made 
by private employers in Canada. The final section of the paper gives a sum-
mary and some conclusions.
In reading this publication, note that we fully accept the economic 
logic of the classical, textbook case for free immigration with all of its posi-
tive effects on freedom, national income, and global welfare. We recognize, 
however, that this theoretical case for free immigration is based on the key 
assumption that governments do not engage in income redistribution by pro-
viding cradle-to-grave security through its welfare-state policies. That this is 
clearly not the case for Canada provides the basis for our considerable and 
important modification of the classical case for free immigration.1 As Milton 
Friedman, who was one of the twentieth century’s staunchest advocates for 
freedom, said: “You cannot simultaneously have free immigration and a wel-
fare state” (Friedman, 1999).
 1 For an exposition of the classical case for immigration, see Grubel (1981) and for the ben-
efits of a free international circulation of “brainy” migrants, see Grubel and Scott (1977). 
A case can be made that immigration into a welfare state forces government to abandon 
its costly social-welfare programs or at least make it more efficient. This argument is not 
found in the text-book case for immigration and our analysis and policy recommenda-
tions are based on the view that the welfare state will be changed only very marginally, if 
at all, by the pressures brought upon it by immigration. The desire of the public for the 
benefits of the welfare state is simply too powerful to allow any significant reductions in 
social benefits. 
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 1 Taxes paid by immigrants
The basic information we use to estimate the personal income taxes paid by 
recent immigrants is shown in table 1. This information was derived from the 
2006 Census Public Use Microdata File (PUMF), which was purchased from 
Statistics Canada (2009). The file contains 844,476 records, presenting data 
from the 2006 Census on individuals representing 2.7% of the Canadian popu-
lation. This sample is large enough to permit reliable conclusions to be drawn on 
the income taxes paid and transfers received by recent cohorts of immigrants.
As can be seen in table 1, the cohort of  64,792 immigrants in the data-
base, who arrived in Canada over the period of 18 years from 1987 to 2004, 
had, in the year 2005,2 an average income of $25,396, on which they paid an 
average of $3,438 in income taxes. The comparable figures for all Canadians 
were an average income of $35,057 and income taxes of $5,995, based on the 
entire sample of 692,509 individuals age 15 and over for whom income and 
tax data was available.3 The table also shows the average employment income 
for the two groups (used in the calculations in table 2). The main differences 
between income and employment income are that the former includes trans-
fer payments as well as earnings from investments. The data does not allow 
us to distinguish between these two sources of income earned in addition to 
that from employment.4 
The last row of table 1 shows the ratio of the average income of immi-
grants to the average income of all Canadians: 72.4%; and the ratio of employ-
ment income: 81.0%; and the ratio of income taxes paid: 57.3%, which was 
derived by dividing rows (1) and (2). The income ratios are larger than the 
tax ratio because the progressivity of the income tax system results in all 
Canadians with higher incomes paying a proportionately higher amount in 
taxes than recent immigrants. The ratio for taxes paid of 57.3% is used in the 
income tax calculations in table 2.
 2 Calendar year 2005 overlaps the 2005/06 fiscal year. Both 2005 and 2005/06 are used 
in this publication because the census data is for calendar year 2005 and the fiscal data 
is for fiscal year 2005/06.
 3 This includes all the individuals in the PUMF sample 15 years of age or older for which 
data was available. While it is the most appropriate group for the purposes of the current 
analysis, it is not the most appropriate for meaningful comparisons of income and tax. For 
that purpose, the sample should be limited to age groups that are most likely to be in the 
labour force. See Grady, 2010 for this type of analysis for the 25-to-64 year age group.
 4 However, the data does show that investment income of immigrants is 41.4% of that 
earned by Canadians, which goes a long way to explain why the average income and 
employment income of immigrants is only 72% and 81% of all Canadians, respectively. 
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Characteristics of immigrants and income taxes paid
There are four points worth noting about the calculations in table 1. First, the 
immigrants who arrived in 2005 are excluded from our calculations since 
they were not necessarily in Canada for the full year and their annual earn-
ings would therefore be biased downward.
Second, the ratios use the average incomes of all immigrants who 
arrived between 1987 and 2004, regardless of the fact that they are hetero-
geneous in a number of ways, just as the sample of all Canadians consists of 
persons of different age, education and other characteristics.
Third, one of the sources of heterogeneity among immigrants is that they 
include all classes of immigrants, which have different average levels of income: 
economic immigrants perform the best, followed by family class or refugees 
depending on the time horizon (Wanner, 2003; Abbott and Beach, 2009). This 
fact has interesting implications for other analysis of immigration policies 
but it is not relevant to our calculations and therefore is not explicitly incor-
porated. At the same time, however, it does strongly influence our proposals 
for reforms of the immigrant selection system presented in section 5 below.
Fourth, the heterogeneity of immigrants extends to their different 
lengths of stay in Canada. Numerous studies have shown that the earnings 
and incomes of immigrants improve through time as they adapt to, and 
become integrated into, the Canadian labour market.5 
 5 The increase in earnings of immigrants through time has attracted much attention from 
researchers: Frenette and Morisette (2003), Worswick (2004), Picot and Sweetman (2005), 
and Picot (2008). These studies traced the incomes of the same cohort of immigrants 
through time. While our data is consistent with the findings of these studies, it is worth 
noting that the results are not strictly comparable since our data reflects the incomes of 
different cohorts in the year 2005 and not the incomes of the same cohorts through time.
Table 1: Income and taxes paid by immigrants and other Canadians in 2005
Average 
Income
Average 
Employment 
Income
Average 
Income Tax 
Paid
Number of 
Observations in 
Sample
(1) Immigrants 1987–2004 $25,396 $21,267 $3,438 64,792
(2) All Canadians $35,057 $26,253 $5,995 692,509
  (1) / (2) 72.4% 81.0% 57.3%
Note: Recent immigrants are compared with all Canadians, which includes themselves, because 
the government revenue and expenditure data, which must be adjusted, is for all Canadians.
Source: Calculations by authors for recent immigrants and the entire Canadian population done 
from Census 2006 PUMF (Statistics Canada, 2009). Total income is provided by the variable totinc 
in the file, and income tax by the variable inctax, both of which are averaged across individu-
als to calculate averages. All recent immigrants and Canadians reporting income or income tax 
were included in the sample.
Immigration and the Canadian Welfare State 2011 / 5
www.fraserinstitute.org / Fraser Institute
In figure 1 we document this phenomenon using data in the PUMF file. 
The graph shows the average income and taxes of immigrants relative to those 
of all Canadians as a function of the time that immigrants have spent in Canada. 
For example, the average income of immigrants who arrived during the period 
from 1999 to 2004 was 62.4% of the average income of all Canadians. For those 
who arrived during the years from 1987 to 1992, the percentage was 83.6. Thus, 
our cross-sectional data for different immigration cohorts in 2005 shows the 
same improvement in the average income of immigrants the longer that the 
immigrant cohort is in Canada as that revealed by data on cohort performance 
across time presented in the studies cited in footnote 4.
Other taxes
Government revenues in Canada are raised not only through the personal 
income taxes just considered but also through a number of other taxes 
imposed by all levels of government. Table 2 shows the types of taxes in 
One of the most interesting and disturbing facts about the incomes of immigrants is 
found in Picot, Garnett, and Sweetman (2005). They discovered that the average incomes of 
cohorts have decreased through time and, while the incomes of these cohorts continued the 
usual pattern of rising as they became more integrated into the labour market, the most recent 
cohorts have never reached the income ratios attained by cohorts that had arrived earlier. 
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Figure 1: Average income and income tax of recent immigrants as percentage of 
those of all Canadians, for cohorts arriving 1999–2004, 1993–1998, 1987–1992
Source: Calculations by authors for recent immigrants and the entire Canadian population done 
from Statistics Canada, Census 2006 PUMF (2009). Total income is provided by the variable totinc 
in the le, and income tax by the variable inctax, both of which are averaged across individuals 
to calculate averages. All recent immigrants and Canadians reporting income or income tax 
were included in the sample.
 
Average incomes
Income taxes
72.9%
83.6%
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column (1), while column (2) gives the total revenue raised by each type of 
tax. Column (3) shows the percentage distribution of revenues among the 
categories. Column (4) translates this total into per-capita amounts, based 
on the country’s estimated population of 31.6 million in 2006. The crucial 
estimate for our analysis is the per-capita taxes paid by immigrants in each 
of the types of taxes shown (6). It is unfortunate that this information is not 
available from publically available sources, nor can it be extracted from the 
PUMF database.6 Therefore, the ratios shown in column (5) are based on 
assumptions spelled out below, but are deliberately biased in favour of over-
stating rather than under-stating the amounts paid by immigrants.
Thus, the ratio for Health and social insurance levies is assumed to be 100% 
on the grounds that these taxes are levied on only a maximum level of income 
that is reached by most immigrants. The ratio for General sales taxes is assumed 
to be 72% on the grounds that the federal value-added tax and provincial 
sales taxes are levied on consumer expenditures that are related to aver-
age income ratios. The ratio for Corporate income taxes is assumed to be 30% 
because recent immigrants are judged likely to hold only small amounts of 
 6 The information on the different types of taxes paid is absent from the PUMF file because 
it is not collected. In the case of the personal income tax, the information is obtained 
through a link between the Census and income-tax data contained in the T1 forms filed 
with Revenue Canada. This link occurs only for T1 filers who specifically consent on the 
Census long form.
Table 2: Taxes paid by Canadians and recent immigrants, all levels of government, 2005/06
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Type of tax $ billions Percentage  
of total 
revenue
Dollars per 
capita for all 
Canadians
Tax paid by 
immigrants 
as % of all 
Canadians
Dollars per 
capita paid  
by Immigrants
Difference ($) in 
per-capita tax, 
(6) − (4)
Personal income taxes 180,757 34.7 5,720 57 3,260 −2,460
Health & social insurance levies 87,354 16.8 2,764 100 2,764 0
General sales taxes 68,538 13.1 2,169 72 1,562 −607
Corporate income taxes 57,859 11.1 1,831 20 366 −1,465
Property & related taxes 51,417 9.9 1,627 41 667 −960
Other taxes 75,510 14.4 2,390 72 1,721 −669
Total 521,435 100.0 16,501 n.a. 10,340 −6,161
Note: The total taxes paid include those paid by immigrants, so that the average paid by non-recent immigrants shown is 
biased downward since recent immigrants are known to have below average tax payments.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010; calculations by authors. 
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common stocks that bear the burden of the corporate income tax. In support 
of this assumption, we note that according to the PUMF data the immigrants’ 
investment income is only 41% of the average of all Canadians and that this 
probably includes a disproportionate amount of investments other than cor-
porate stocks.7 It was assumed that the amounts paid as Property and related 
taxes and Other taxes were related to total income.
The last row of table 2 shows the sum of all taxes paid by the average 
immigrant ($10,340) and the average of all Canadians including immigrants 
($16,501) in the fiscal year 2006 (ending March 31, 2006 and overlapping 
with the 2005 calendar year from the Census). These values will be used 
below in the calculation of the fiscal transfers from other Canadians to recent 
immigrants.
 7 Economic theory suggests that corporate income taxes are passed on to consumers. 
However, this conclusion is not relevant to the present analysis. Instead, it is legitimate 
to ask who bears the direct fiscal burden of paying the tax as a result of the ownership of 
corporations.
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 2 Benefits received
Government spending is designed to benefit all people living in Canada. 
However, since one of the objectives of the welfare state is to redistribute 
income, many spending programs benefit those with low incomes propor-
tionately more than those with high incomes, just as taxes fall more heavily 
on those with high incomes than on those with low incomes. While the redis-
tributive effects of government spending are clear in the aggregate, there is 
no statistical information available to allow direct accounting of the degree to 
which demographic groups like single mothers, the disabled, and immigrants 
benefit from each. Therefore, the following analysis of the degree to which 
immigrants benefit from specific spending programs relies on assumptions, 
which are spelled out and justified for most categories by reference to some 
fragmentary evidence that exists on the incidence of spending.8
Our calculations of the expenditure component of the net fiscal trans-
fer to recent immigrants are presented in table 3. Column (1) lists the dif-
ferent types of spending programs, column (2) total expenditures, and col-
umn (3) expenditures per capita for all Canadians based on a population 
of 31.6 million. The amounts in table 3 represent the spending by all levels 
of Canadian government, consolidated so as to remove intergovernmental 
transfers. Program spending excludes debt-service payments of $44.8 billion, 
which do not provide current services for Canadians and immigrants and 
were therefore excluded from our calculations. This exclusion is reasonable 
on the grounds that, to the extent that the past deficits necessitating the inter-
est payments resulted in the creation of tangible assets like infrastructure and 
 8 In this context, it is useful to introduce two historic notes. First, at the time the social con-
tract guiding the welfare-state provisions was adopted, the issue of including immigrants 
was moot because they had records of economic success that prevented their identifica-
tion as a group needing net fiscal transfers. Therefore, their arrival and existence were not 
an issue and no statistical records were kept officially to record the benefits they received. 
The situation is different now. Recently arrived immigrants are a distinct and large group 
of people who, according to government statistics, have low average incomes and other 
needs that are covered under the contract. Yet records are still not being kept. 
Second, in Canada since 1980 even refugees who are not landed immigrants but are in 
the process of having their claims assessed for residency are automatically entitled to all 
the benefits of the country’s social program. This condition is the result of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s “Singh decision” (Singh, 1985), which was based on the court’s inter-
pretation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Parliament never took on the task of 
clarifying the relevant clauses of the Charter to prevent the burden imposed on citizens 
by this ruling.
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the maintenance of intangible assets like freedom and the Canadian way of 
life, they provide benefits that accrue equally to Canadians and immigrants. 
The figures in column (4) are central to the calculation of net fiscal 
costs presented in section 3. They show the percentage assumed to apply to 
the benefits received on average by recent immigrants relative to the bene-
fits received by all Canadians under each type of program. In most columns, 
this figure is 100% and reflects the view that recent immigrants benefit as 
much per-capita as do other Canadians. In some cases, such as in the cat-
egory Environment, the underlying rationale should be obvious. Most readers 
will agree that all persons in Canada benefit equally from the maintenance 
Table 3: Benefits received by Canadians and recent immigrants, all levels of government, 2005/06
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Type of government expenditure  
(program spending)
Total 
expenditure
($ millions)
Per-capita  
benefits  
received ($)
Benefits received 
by recent 
Immigrants (% of 
other Canadians)
Per-capita 
benefits received 
by recent 
Immigrants ($)
General government services 20,074 635 100 635
Protection of persons and property 43,299 1,370 72 987
Health 99,531 3,150 100 3,150
Social services 164,568 5,208 100 5,208
Education 84,760 2,682 109 2,924
Recreation and culture 14,268 452 100 452
Labour, employment and immigration 2,480 78 120 94
Housing 4,527 143 110 158
Regional planning and development 2,235 71 100 71
Transportation and communication 24,838 786 100 786
Resource conservation and industrial development 19,760 625 100 625
Environment 13,158 416 100 416
Foreign affairs and international assistance 5,585 177 100 177
Research establishments 1,859 59 100 59
Other expenditures 1,738 55 100 55
Total 502,680 15,907   15,797
Note: Spending categories for which the immigrants are estimated to receive lower or higher benefits are show, e.g.: 
Protection of persons and property. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010; calculations by authors.
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or improvement in the quality of the environment. Most of the other spend-
ing categories to which the 100% figure has been applied should be similarly 
obvious.9 Let us now turn to a discussion of the spending categories for which 
the immigrants are estimated to receive lower or higher benefits. 
Protection of persons and property
Here we assume that the benefits from protection are proportional to income. 
Since the income of immigrants is 72% of that of Canadians, we use this 
figure here. 
Education
Spending on Education, for which the percentage is assumed to be 109. This 
requires some explanation as it results from an analysis of the three main 
underlying components: primary and secondary education, post-secondary educa-
tion, and special retraining services (Statistics Canada, 2010). For primary and sec-
ondary education, it is assumed that recent immigrants obtain a benefit of 150% 
of the Canadian average. This reflects the fact that, according to the Census, 
recent immigrants received a per-capita share of child benefits that is 66% 
higher than the Canadian average, but it also makes some allowance for the 
fact that the child benefit is income tested inflating this number somewhat. 
For post secondary education, it is assumed that the benefit is only 50% of the 
average. According to a study of the use of educational services in Canada by 
Horry and Walker (1994), the children of families with low incomes are less 
likely to attend institutions of higher learning than the children of families 
with high incomes. The Census suggests this might be the case as the rate of 
attendance at school for recent immigrants was only 75% of the Canadian 
average. As attendance at primary and secondary schools is compulsory, the 
largest part of this difference must be attributed to difference in attendance 
at post-secondary institutions. For special retraining services, it is assumed that 
recent immigrants receive 20% more benefits because of their greater need. 
For the fourth component, other education, it was assumed that recent immi-
grants receive the same average per-capita benefits as all Canadians. 
 9 The provision of many government services requires the use of large fixed investments 
and the marginal cost of covering additional persons is near zero. Spending on roads 
and the environment are good examples. The 250,000 immigrants who arrive every year 
amount to only a very small addition to the number of people who use Canada’s roads 
and other infrastructure. It can therefore be argued that their arrival does not necessitate 
new spending in these categories. However, this argument is valid only in the short run. 
Eventually, as more and more immigrants arrive and add to traffic, the capacity of roads 
has to be increased to accommodate them. In the present analysis, we look beyond the 
short-run effects and assume that immigrants add to the need for fixed investment in 
infrastructure and the agencies administering environmental protection so that the fixed 
costs increase with the arrival of additional immigrants.
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Labour, employment and immigration
Spending on Labour, employment and immigration is assumed to benefit immi-
grants 20% more than other Canadians because they have more dealings 
with the government on immigration issues related to the family reunifica-
tion program, the processing of refugee claims, and related issues. The low 
average incomes of immigrants also lead to the use of more benefits under 
programs that deal with labour markets and employment.
Housing
Housing is the final category of spending that immigrants are assumed to use 
more than other Canadians. The assumption is that immigrants benefit by 10% 
more than other Canadians on the grounds that upon arrival they have tem-
porary access to free or heavily subsidized housing while they settle and find 
employment. Furthermore, the many low-income immigrant families bene-
fit disproportionately from government programs designed to make hous-
ing more affordable, particularly in the urban areas where they tend to settle.
Total benefits
The last row of table 3 shows that the average per-capita amount of benefits 
received by all Canadians exceeds that received by immigrants by $110, or 
$15,907 minus $15,797.
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 3 Taxation and benefits together
The fiscal cost imposed on other Canadians by recent immigrants through pro-
visions of the welfare state can be calculated by using the following formula:
FT = (Ta − Ti) + (Gi − Ga),
where FT is the average per-capita fiscal transfer to immigrants from all 
Canadians, T is the average per-capita taxes paid, G is the average per-capita 
benefit received through program spending, a denotes all Canadians, and i 
denotes recent immigrants. Using the figures derived in the preceding sec-
tions, the fiscal costs are:
FT = ($16,501 − $10,340) + ($15,797 − $15,907) = $6,161 − $110 = $6,051
This figure represents the central finding of this study: on average, immi-
grants coming into the country between 1987 and 2004 received per-capita 
fiscal transfers from other Canadians worth $6,051 in the fiscal year 2006.10 
It is important to note, and is evident from the analysis above, that 
these transfers do not appear explicitly in any government accounts or other 
official statistics. They are simply the result of the way in which Canada’s wel-
fare state operates and the officially documented fact that recent immigrants 
on average earn much lower incomes than other Canadians.
It is useful to put the figure of $6,051 for the average, annual, per-capita 
fiscal transfers from all Canadians to recent immigrants in perspective. First, 
if the average immigrant pays taxes and receives benefits for 45 years between 
his or her arrival and end of life, every recent immigrant benefits from transfers 
worth $272,295, disregarding all effects of discounting and inflation. Second, 
during the 18-year period from 1987 to 2004, a total of 3.9 million immigrants 
arrived in Canada according to the administrative data collected by Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada (2010). In the fiscal year 2006, they would have 
imposed a cost of $23.6 billion on Canadians if none of the immigrants had 
 10 It is interesting to note that the equivalent figure in Grubel (2005) was $6,294, suggesting 
that the more reliable data on immigrants’ relative incomes and tax payments did not have 
a significant impact on the estimate, though it might have been expected that the growth 
in average income and government spending during the five additional years covered in 
the present study would have increased this number. But, this should be offset by the fact 
that using all Canadians instead of other Canadians to calculate the amount of the fiscal 
transfer tends to understate its amount.
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emigrated or died. However, because of emigration and mortality, of those 3.9 
million immigrants only 2.7 million still remained in Canada according to the 
2006 Census, a representative sample of which is found in the PUMF database 
used in the basic calculation of costs above.11 The annual fiscal subsidies to 
these remaining immigrants in 2006 were $16.3 billion.12
To put these figures into perspective, it is useful to consider them in 
relation to some program spending by the federal government in 2006. The 
larger of the estimates, $23.6 billion, is 4.7% of total program spending of 
$503 billion, 1.18 times the cost of government services of $20 billion and 
1.79 times the spending on the environment of $13.2 billion. Using the lower 
estimate of $16.3 billion, the transfers were 3.2%, 82% and 123% of the three 
selected federal government spending figures, respectively.
It is clear that the choice of the number of immigrants receiving fiscal 
transfers made in the preceding calculations reflects our judgement. We used 
the number of immigrants who have arrived in 1987 and later because it was 
after Canada’s controls on immigration were eased and the annual inflow of 
immigrants was allowed to increase substantially. This is the group used in 
the compilation of the income and taxation statistics shown in table 1 and in 
the analysis presented in tables 2 and 3. 
It would also be quite defensible to use the number of immigrants who 
arrived over a longer time period, including those who arrived after 2004 (if 
the data was available) and before 1987. However, the purpose of our analysis 
is not to come up with the definitive estimate of the fiscal costs, but instead 
to show that Canada’s current immigration policies are generating substan-
tial fiscal transfers from all Canadians to recent immigrants. It is our hope 
that this will be sufficient to encourage public discussion about the afford-
ability of existing immigration policies and possible reform proposals. And 
the need for this discussion will only become even more pressing over time 
as the size of the transfers to immigrants will increase every year with the 
arrival of additional under-performing cohorts of immigrants.
 11 An interesting issue is the extent to which the immigrants leaving Canada returned home 
or went on to greener pastures, perhaps in the United States. This is important because 
of its impact on the labour market performance of immigrants. More research is needed 
on whether Canada is losing some of its most successful immigrants or only those who 
were unable to adapt to Canada. It would also be of interest to learn how many of these 
immigrants will return to Canada later in their lives to take advantage of Canada’s gener-
ous health and welfare system.
 12 The number for 2010 would be even higher as approximately another million immigrants 
(net) entered Canada over the period from 2005 to 2009. If these immigrants and the 
predecessors continued to underperform in the labour market as seems likely given the 
disproportionate impact of the recession on immigrants, another $5.9 billion could be 
added to the $16.3 billion, raising the net fiscal benefits to immigrants net of emigrants 
in 2010 to $22.2 billion.
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 4 Other benefits and costs  
of immigration
Many Canadians with whom we have discussed our estimates of the costs 
of current immigration policies have suggested that they represent only one 
part of the equation, neglecting some economic and social benefits immi-
grants bring to Canadians that are not included in the narrow estimate of 
fiscal transfers to immigrants. The nature and merit of these benefits were 
discussed in Grubel (2005) and (2009). For readers not familiar with these 
publications, we briefly summarize, evaluate, and update the arguments here.
Immigrants and their offspring will eventually  
repay the fiscal transfers they received
This view is based on the notion that immigrants will repay the transfers 
they have received once they are fully integrated into the economy and they 
and their children earn wages that are high enough. Clearly, the truth of this 
notion depends on how well the new Canadians and their children will do eco-
nomically in the future. If, in the future, the average incomes of these immi-
grants only just reach the average income of all Canadians, there will be no 
repayment of the transfers since as a group they will only pay taxes that match 
the benefits they receive. Immigrants will repay the transfers only if they 
eventually earn significantly more than average incomes for a period in their 
lives long enough to repay the earlier costs incurred on them. Unfortunately, 
the available empirical evidence suggests that recent immigrants are not even 
closing the income gap with non-immigrants (Picot and Sweetman, 2005; 
Picot, 2008), a far cry from earning incomes above average.13
 13 The statistical evidence on the persistence of immigrants’ low average earnings can be 
considered something of a surprise since Canada has used a points program for selection 
that puts heavy emphasis on educational attainment and language proficiency and, as a 
result, has attracted disproportionately many immigrants who are professionals with uni-
versity education. However, in reality only a relatively small proportion (less than a fifth) 
of immigrants admitted are actually selected based on points and most are members or 
the families of skill-class immigrants or family-class immigrants. 
Attempts to explain this phenomenon point to the fact that Canadian professional 
associations often do not accept the educational background of immigrants unless they 
pass examinations establishing their competence. Many immigrants do not pass these 
examinations and have to work in lower-paid occupations where the value of their 
human capital depreciates and they get caught in a low-wage trap that is extremely 
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The offspring of immigrants are also not likely to repay the fiscal costs 
their parents have imposed on Canadians. The reason is that, as these off-
spring tend to integrate fully into Canadian society, their economic character-
istics and average incomes tend to become the same as those of all Canadians. 
They receive on average benefits equal to their average income and tax pay-
ments so that they generate no fiscal surpluses.14 And there is no guarantee 
that this will happen even for the next generation if they are too disadvan-
taged from the onset by their parents’ low incomes.
Immigrants are needed to solve the problem  
of unfunded liabilities of social programs
The unfunded liabilities of Canada’s social programs are caused by low birth 
rates and the aging of the population, which were not expected when they 
were introduced in the years after the Second World War. The argument in 
favour of more immigrants to solve this problem is deceptively simple and 
appealing. Young immigrants will pay taxes that can be used to pay for the 
funds going to the elderly recipients of social program benefits.
Unfortunately, while this simple argument is true in principle, it 
misses the magnitude of the existing problem, which has been studied by 
considering the best estimates of future birth and death rates of Canadians 
and exploring what happens to the age structure of the population and the 
difficult to exit. And all of this is being exacerbated by the impact of the recent reces-
sion, which has hit new immigrants and other recent entrants to the labour force much 
harder than more established workers. 
Controversies exist over the causes of the failure of highly educated immigrants to 
land jobs in Canada that are consistent with their qualifications. One of the reasons may 
be that the professional associations set tests that discriminate against foreign educational 
attainments. Another may be that the quality of education obtained by the immigrants 
abroad does not meet Canadian standards or that potential employers do not know the 
quality of education provided by the degree-granting institutions and are unwilling to 
take the risk that the quality is low. Yet another possible explanation is that some of the 
certificates of educational attainment are bogus and that the Canadian officials in charge 
of disqualifying individuals with such certificates have insufficient resources to do so 
effectively. Chances are that all of these explanations of the poor economic record of 
highly skilled immigrants contribute to the phenomenon. There are thus many difficul-
ties that must be overcome in any attempt to correct the situation.
 14 It might also be noted that the issue of repayment of the fiscal burden is complicated 
by the fact that it is imposed on one generation of Canadians, which would not benefit 
even if the offspring of the immigrants were to earn above-average incomes. The fiscal 
surpluses thus generated would go to another generation of Canadians, which may or 
may not experience a reduction in immigration or the selection of immigrants that have 
above-average incomes and thus do not impose a fiscal burden on it. This possibility raises 
issues of the fairness of intergenerational transfers.
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resultant dependency ratio (number of retired persons receiving pensions 
and requiring costly medical care relative to the number of persons working 
and paying taxes). One study of the issue is by Statistics Canada and comes 
to the following conclusion:
Even a substantial increase in the number of immigrants could not 
stop Canada’s population aging. For example, if Canada was to admit 
four times as many immigrants per year, the population’s median age 
would still increase, from the current 38.8 to 44.1 years in 2056. This 
would mean an average of about one million immigrants per year for 
the next 50 years. Regardless, the proportion of seniors would increase 
from the current 12.3% to 22.3% in 2056. (Statistics Canada, 2006: 6)
In another study, Banerjee and Robson (2009) consider what number of 
immigrants would be required to maintain the current 0.2 dependency ratio 
(there are 20 retirees who receive benefits from the taxes paid by every 100 
workers). In one section of their study, they assume that future immigrants on 
average are only 22 years old, which is an age that would make them long-term 
contributors to the funds needed to finance social benefits for retirees. While 
it may be impossible to find enough immigrants of this age, the assumption 
provides a powerful insight into the magnitude of the problem of unfunded 
liabilities caused by the aging population and low birthrate. 
Tellingly, Banerjee and Robson’s calculations show that to maintain 
the dependency ratio at 0.2 until 2050, the annual rate of immigration would 
have to average about 2% of the population (it has been about 0.75% in recent 
years). This rate of immigration would raise Canada’s population to 139 mil-
lion in 2050 and the number of immigrants would be 1.8 million that year 
alone. In another calculation, they assume that the selection of immigrants 
continues to bring in immigrants with the same age characteristics as are 
produced under the present system. They find that under these assumptions 
the maintenance of the dependency ratio would result in a population of 235 
million in 2050. 
These studies clearly indicate that immigration cannot “solve” the prob-
lems likely to be caused by the aging of Canada’s population. The number 
of immigrants required would seriously tax the country’s ability to absorb 
them in the economy and society. It would also be very difficult to find the 
required number of immigrants with the desired skills, education, and age, 
especially since in traditional source countries fertility is in decline and eco-
nomic opportunities and incomes are rising rapidly. 
It can be argued that, while increased immigration cannot “solve” the 
problems of population aging and low fertility rates in Canada, it can at least 
make a contribution. However, as the simulations show, even small reduc-
tions in population ageing require greatly increased rates of immigration; 
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and, as Banerjee and Robson point out, there are other, more efficient ways 
to decrease the size of unfunded liabilities of the country’s social programs. 
The best of these involves increasing the average age of retirement gradually 
by just two to three years.
The most obvious solution to the problem lies in an increase in the 
fertility rate of Canadians to the level of 2.1 children per woman, which is 
required for long-run stability of the population. Past attempts by govern-
ments to increase fertility rates have not been successful, but it is interest-
ing to speculate whether reduced immigration rates would do so. Consider 
that Canadians of child-bearing age weigh many factors when they decide 
on the number of children they wish to have. Two of these factors undoubt-
edly are the cost of housing and concerns about the environment. As noted 
above, both of these factors are increased by the mass immigration that 
results from present policies over many years. Therefore, it is possible that 
reduced immigration would raise the fertility rate of Canadians, and that 
could lower or even solve the country’s problem of unfunded liabilities of 
social programs. 
Immigrants are needed to fill job vacancies
Employers in Canada are strongly in favour of present high rates of immigra-
tion because they consider immigrants to be an attractive source of workers 
to fill the low-paying jobs that Canadians do not seem to want or jobs that 
require high levels of skills and training that are scarce among Canadians. It 
is not possible to fault employers for taking this position. They are rightly 
concerned with the bottom-line of their businesses and they are entitled to 
lobby for policies to improve it. 
However, what is good for business is not necessarily always good for 
Canadians in general, especially if benefits for business are paid for by the 
general public through higher taxes, as is the case with immigrants that fill 
the low-paying jobs and induce fiscal transfers under the provisions of the 
welfare state. The public is repaid in part for these subsidies by lower pro-
duction costs that are passed on to consumers through lower prices of goods 
and services. An empirical study is needed to establish whether taxpayers as 
consumers benefit or lose in the process, but there is a strong presumption 
that they lose because government subsidies in any form induce the ineffi-
cient use of resources.
Another aspect of the relationship between the need to fill job vacan-
cies and immigration is that immigrants add to the demand for labour because 
of the purchases they make and demand for infrastructure they create. In this 
context, it is important to realize that in any dynamic market economy, there 
are temporary shortages and surpluses of labour, simply because of the exist-
ence of business cycles, which have afflicted market economies throughout 
history, even when the role of governments in the economy was minimal. 
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In addition, temporary shortages are aggravated by the length of time 
required to educate and train workers, especially for occupations requiring 
high levels of skill. The labour shortages can be alleviated by migrants, but 
present immigration policies fail to vary immigration levels according to 
conditions in the business cycle and do not repatriate immigrants that are 
no longer needed during periods of high unemployment. To the contrary, 
under present policies, immigrants add to unemployment if they arrive when 
unemployment is high.
The question is, whether in the absence of immigration, Canada would 
suffer from a permanent shortage of workers. Economic theory suggests 
that such permanent shortages would not persist. If, for instance, workers 
in the garbage collection industry, which is sometimes cited as an industry 
with job vacancies Canadians do not want to fill, cannot be found, employers 
would raise wage rates until the vacant jobs are filled. Employers would end 
up with the same rates of profit though, because they would adopt labour 
saving capital and the producers of the capital would come up with new 
technologies that would save even more labour and raise the skill level of 
the job. Their profits would also be maintained as they pass on some of the 
higher labour costs to the consumers of their services. These higher costs 
in turn would induce consumers to reduce their need for garbage collection 
so that in the end, an efficient equilibrium in demand, supply, prices, and 
wages would be achieved. 
A similar process of adjustment as that described for low-skill and 
low-wage jobs would occur in industries that have vacancies for jobs requir-
ing high levels of education and training. In the absence of immigrant work-
ers, wages would rise and induce more Canadians to get the needed edu-
cation and training until the shortages are eliminated. And, Canada does 
have an educational and training system capable of producing the required 
skilled workers.
It is ironic that, under the present system that fills job vacancies with 
immigrants, there exists the possibility that immigration does not eliminate 
labour shortages but perversely worsens them. The reason is that immigrants 
add to the demand for goods, services, and government infrastructure and 
other services. No empirical studies of this phenomenon have been made but 
it is interesting to note that the number of recent immigrants who have settled 
in Vancouver during the five-year period from 2005 to 2009 is 180,846,15 or 
36,169 per year, which comes to about 3,000 per month. If we assume that 
the average family size of these immigrants is three, then there are 1,000 fam-
ilies requiring the construction of new dwelling units per month or about 250 
 15 The numbers used in this paragraph are found in Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 
2010: Permanent residents, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2009/
permanent/>.
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every week.16 Furthermore, these immigrant families add to the demand for 
spaces in schools, universities, hospitals, transit facilities, airports, roads, and 
bridges. The construction of all of these facilities requires labour and creates 
labour shortages that in turn will be filled by even more immigrants that will 
require more construction, and so on in a never-ending cycle. 
Immigrants are needed for economic growth
Immigrants increase the growth of aggregate national income and output, 
which is often argued to be a desirable end in itself. More sophisticated argu-
ments are that such growth raises Canada’s influence in the world and that 
it results in dynamics that encourage growth by stimulating change and a 
general belief in progress. In fact, maximizing aggregate national income is 
a totally inappropriate goal of government immigration policies. The focus 
should instead be on maximizing immigration’s effects on per-capita income 
and thus living standards.17 To illustrate this point, it could be noted that few 
Canadians would prefer to live in China, which has the second highest aggre-
gate national income but still has living standards, measured as per-capita 
GDP, of less than a tenth of Canada’s.
The main finding of this study is that in recent years the low average 
incomes of immigrants in combination with the provisions of the welfare 
state have reduced the average per-capita incomes of Canadians. The issue 
therefore is whether a larger aggregate income offsets these reductions in 
per-capita income because of the benefits derived from greater influence 
in world affairs and the beneficial dynamics that feed back on growth itself.
The idea that the average Canadian puts value on the fact that the 
country has more influence on world affairs has not been tested empirically 
but, even if this were the case, it is safe to suggest that it is not as import-
ant as the level of income. The idea that aggregate economic growth driven 
 16 In 2009, the number of principal skilled immigrants into Canada was 40,735. They 
were accompanied by their immediate family of spouses and dependents numbering 
55,227. During the same year, 46,921 spouses, dependents, and older children arrived 
in Canada to join their spouses who earlier had arrived as skilled immigrants. The total 
number of persons related to the 40,735 skilled immigrants therefore was 40,735 + 
55,227 + 46,921 = 142,983. This number implies an average family size of 3.5 for the 
40,735 skilled immigrants.
This calculation is merely illustrative since it does not account for the fact that the 
family reunification immigrants join skilled immigrants who had arrived in earlier years 
and that 17,179 parents and grandparents of skilled immigrants and their spouses arrived 
in 2009 and are likely to have joined their offspring in their dwellings. Available data does 
not permit these refinements to the calculations to be made.
 17 A committee of Britain’s Upper House of Parliament criticized the Labour government 
for misleading the public by justifying its high immigration policies on the grounds that 
they raise total national income (Green, 2009).
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by high population increases leads to higher per-capita income involves the 
complicated and inconclusive empirical findings of the theory and literature 
of economic growth. 
Moreover, per-capita income is only an imperfect measure of living 
standards. Non-monetary factors like the pollution and congestion that 
increase with population growth and have negative effects on living standards 
also should be taken into account. If these determinants of living standards 
were properly reflected in measures of living standards, the countries with 
low population growth could easily have higher real per-capita well-being 
than those with higher population growth. So for the purposes at hand, suf-
fice it to say that there is no conclusive evidence that a larger Canada would 
be better and would benefit existing Canadians.
Miscellaneous benefits
A final set of benefits often mentioned in discussions over immigration poli-
cies involves non-economic factors. One such idea is that, as citizens of a rich 
nation of caring individuals, Canadians are ennobled by allowing people from 
the rest of the world to share the country’s economic riches, political stability, 
and tolerance and by allowing them to escape the misery found in their own 
countries. While it is not possible to put any dollar value on such feel-good 
benefits stemming from our current immigration policies, it is legitimate to 
note that it comes at a considerable fiscal cost and that the same number of 
poor foreigners could be helped at a much lower cost through traditional 
foreign-aid programs. Canada’s foreign assistance is budgeted at $5 billion in 
fiscal year 2010/2011, just over 30% of our estimate of the net fiscal transfer 
to recent immigrants. These bilateral and international aid programs do not 
require the relocation of individuals that disrupt their lives, separate fam-
ilies, and bring large costs for taxpayers needed to assist immigrants settling 
in Canada. 
Another benefit from immigration often mentioned is that it enriches 
the cultural life of Canadians. The value of this feel-good benefit also is impos-
sible to measure but it is legitimate to note that Canadians already enjoy an 
abundance of ethnic restaurants and festivals and that further increases are 
likely to bring relatively smaller additional benefits.
A final benefit from immigration often mentioned is that a tolerant 
multicultural society nourished by immigrants is better than the Eurocentric 
society that existed before the 1970s. This view is deeply entrenched in the 
minds of many Canadians and is a source of pride. However, as important 
research has shown, there are grounds for concern that the multicultural-
ism existing in Canada carries with it threats to national unity, culture, and 
security,18 as well as the fiscal costs documented above.
 18 For a full discussion of these issues, see Gallagher, 2009 and Mansur, 2009.
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Other costs: effects on poverty
Canadians are concerned about the distribution of income, especially the 
proportion of families that have incomes below what Statistics Canada 
defines as the low-incomes cut off (LICO) levels.19 Unfortunately, under the 
present immigrant selection system, large proportions of immigrants have 
incomes that are below the poverty line for prolonged periods after their 
arrival in Canada. This fact is documented in a study by Statistics Canada 
(Picot, Lu and Hou, 2009), the results of which are presented in table 4.
The data in this table shows that, based on market income, in 2005 
the poverty rate among Canadian-born was 23.2% while it was 32.7% among 
all immigrants. These figures imply that rate of poverty among immigrants 
was 60% greater than among Canadian-born. The corresponding figures for 
income after transfers and before taxes were 13.3% and 21.6%, respectively, 
indicating that the governments’ policies to reduce poverty are having the 
desired effect. However, the excess of poverty among immigrants under this 
definition of income remains at 60%. 
The table also shows that the share of immigrants among Canadians 
with low income decreases with the length of time immigrants are in Canada 
and that after 20 years in the country, immigrants have the same poverty rate 
as the Canadian-born. This desirable effect is due to the efforts of immigrants 
to improve their language and other skills needed to be successful in the 
labour market. However, again there is no guarantee that this will continue 
to happen in the future at the same pace. Burton and Phipps (2009: 4–5) 
have found that the position of children coming from low-income families in 
the income distribution exhibited considerable “stickiness” and that this was 
exacerbated by their being “non-white” as are the greater majority of recent 
immigrants. However, it is clear that during the 19 years of above-average 
poverty rates, these immigrants receive above average amounts of benefits 
aimed at reducing poverty. The costs of these payments are a component of 
the fiscal burden estimated above.
Note that these estimates are biased downward since they do not take 
account of the fact that the immigrants with incomes below the poverty line 
tend to have low skills. They compete with Canadian-born workers with low 
skills and depress the wages they earn. As a result, the level of poverty among 
Canadian-born and the benefits they are provided with are greater than they 
would be without the competition for jobs stemming from the immigrants.
The fact that poverty rates among immigrants relative to those among 
the Canadian-born do not continue to decrease after 20 years provides 
indirect evidence that, after initial periods of learning and labour market 
 19 We cannot enter here into a discussion about the shortcomings of the LICO index as 
a measure of poverty. For a full discussion of different definitions and measurement of 
poverty, see Sarlo, 1996.
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integration, the economic performance of immigrants generally is the same as 
that of other Canadians. If indeed this proposition is correct under the most 
optimistic of assumptions, it follows that on average they pay taxes equal to 
the benefits they receive, just as all Canadians do. The immigrants, therefore, 
do not ultimately pay enough taxes to compensate Canadians for the fiscal 
costs they imposed during the 19 years when their economic performance 
was below average. And, there is real risk that the continuing deterioration 
of the performance of recent immigrants in the labour market could result in 
the end of the convergence that has heretofore characterized the Canadian 
immigration experience.
Table 4: Low income-rates, Immigrants and Canadian-born, 2005 (Percent of all income earners)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Canadian- 
born
All  
immigrants
Years since immigration
5 or less 6–10 11–16 16–20 20 +
Market income
Percent 23.2 32.7 43.4 35.2 34.3 29.4 28.4
Ratio (3) … (8)/(2) 1.6 2.7 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.0
After transfers, before taxes
Percent 13.3 21.6 36.0 28.0 25.8 21.5 13.3
Ratio (3) … (8)/(2) 1.6 2.7 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.0
Source: Picot, Lu and Hou, 2009.
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 5 Policy recommendations
Before turning to our proposals for changes in Canadian immigration poli-
cies flowing from the findings just presented, we wish to introduce some 
ideas that should enter into decisions about changes to immigration policies. 
First, most Canadians are happy to live with the welfare state that redis-
tributes income from the rich to the poor, be they the unemployed, the sick, 
or the elderly. But the transfers to immigrants are altogether different from 
those to needy Canadians. Until they arrive at our borders, immigrants are 
foreigners and not part of the Canadian social contract that guides the welfare 
state provisions. Immigrants are only here because we allow them to come, so 
that the fiscal burdens they impose can be attributed to our deliberate deci-
sion to allow them to become landed immigrants. By the same token, we are 
free to stop these fiscal burdens on ourselves if we choose to do so either by 
changing immigration policies or by severely limiting immigrants’ access to 
the benefits of the welfare state.
Second, it is important to consider that Canadians have the right to 
limit access to the country’s social institutions, income, and wealth that they 
and their ancestors have created. In a sense, Canada is like a private club 
(Gibson, 2009), whose members have the right to exclude others from shar-
ing in its benefits without proper compensation to existing members. Clubs 
do not allow non-members just to enter the premises and use the facilities. 
Nor do they allow individual members to grant the free use of club privileges 
to outsiders just because it suits them. What is right for clubs in the minds 
of most Canadians should also be right for Canada.
Third, in a free society like Canada’s, individuals decide to maximize 
their well-being by considering choices they face with regard to their work, 
spending, investment, and many other issues. One of these choices involves 
the number of children they wish to raise. Into this decision enter personal 
preferences, but also considerations about the effect that their children will 
have on the size of the country’s population, congestion, pollution, climate 
change, and overall quality of life for themselves and the country and world 
as a whole. The government of Canada should be obligated to respect the 
population growth that results from the decisions made by Canadians and 
should not change it without much more public consultation than has ever 
taken place concerning these consequences of population growth.20
Finally, the precarious fiscal conditions of Canadian governments 
caused by short-run cyclical deficits and, more important in the long run, by 
 20 This idea is found and discussed more deeply in Krikorian, 2008. 
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the unfunded liabilities of social programs, give special urgency to the dis-
cussion of immigration policies at the beginning of the second decade of the 
twenty-first century. Changes in immigration policies can contribute to the 
alleviation, or possibly even the elimination, of fiscal deficits. Timely steps 
to curtail further increases in the fiscal burdens imposed by poorly selected 
immigrants will reduce fiscal pressures on governments and curb the growth 
of underfunded liabilities of social programs such as health and pensions. The 
money saved could be used to lower taxes or reduce debt from what they would 
be otherwise and ultimately to meet the fiscal demands of an aging population.
Changes to immigration policies
Changes in immigration policies have profound and complex effects on the 
economy, society, and culture. They need to be discussed publicly and widely. 
Indeed they should ultimately be subjected to a public referendum or become 
a major issue in regular elections before being enacted by parliament. The 
changes to Canada’s existing immigration policies that we propose are offered 
as a starting point for such discussions.
As a general and important point, we want to make it clear that our 
proposed policies are not designed explicitly to reduce or move to zero the 
level of immigration. They are thus not “anti-immigration.” Rather they are 
aimed solely at eliminating the fiscal burden imposed on Canadians through 
current policies. As will be seen below, under our proposed policy changes, 
the number and composition of immigrants will be determined largely by 
market forces. Overall immigration levels could, in theory, increase, decrease, 
or remain unchanged. But whatever the new levels may turn out to be, they 
will prevent further increases in the size of the existing fiscal burden. 
The system for selecting immigrants to Canada proposed below repre-
sents a radical reform of Canada’s existing immigration system. It shares some 
features with “TN status” used relatively successfully under the NAFTA treaty 
signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Under it, nationals of one 
of the signatory countries who possess specified skills and have valid offers of 
employment are allowed to take up residence in either of the other countries 
through a grant of “TN status” (which for Mexicans requires a visa). This TN 
status, which is initially for three years, can be renewed a number of times or 
even indefinitely. However, it does not lead to permanent residency or “green 
card” status and thus does not qualify the individual and his or her dependants 
to become immigrants in the traditional sense and ultimately to acquire cit-
izenship. Holders of temporary work visas or status who become and remain 
unemployed for a specified time can be required to leave the country.21 Our 
 21 Our proposal is also consistent with recommendations made by Sweetman (2004) and 
in the OECD’s report on Canada’s immigration system: “Canadian immigration policy 
could make greater use of temporary work permits” (2003: 123). Since this report was 
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proposal also bears some similarities with the existing Temporary Foreign 
Worker Program (TFWP), which has been expanded to cover growing num-
bers of highly skilled and educated. But again the TFWP does not include a 
generally available formal pathway to permanent residency status (the Canada 
Experience Class, however, does allow TFWs and students to apply for perma-
nent residency status from inside Canada).
The following specific proposals contain time lines and other discrete 
criteria that in most cases are made provisionally and need to be discussed 
widely before they are ready to be embodied in legislation. Readers should 
keep this fact in mind and focus on the merit of the general objectives of, and 
principles underlying, the proposed policies.
 1 Entry into Canada for settlement is granted only to foreigners who have a valid 
offer for employment in Canada in occupations specified in a list created by 
the federal government with the assistance of private-sector employers. All 
the grounds for granting immigrant visas presently in place are to be discon-
tinued, except those applicable to refugee claimants, which are largely set 
by international treaty obligations and will not be discussed here. And, the 
Temporary Foreign Worker Program would, of course, also be replaced by 
our proposed new program,22 as would the Provincial Nominee Programs 
negotiated with most provincial governments.
 2 Applicants with valid job offers will receive temporary work visas for them-
selves and visitors’ visas for their dependants. The work visas will be valid 
for two years or as long as the foreigners remain employed and they can be 
extended for two more years. The loss of employment is cause for deporta-
tion after a grace period of three months to find a new job.
 3 After the end of four years, and unlike under the TFWP, the foreigners admit-
ted can become landed immigrants with all the rights and obligations 
accorded this type of visa presently. Landed immigrants become eligible to 
apply for full citizenship two years after they achieve this status.
The role of government
The government’s role in the operation of the proposed temporary work visa 
system is limited to:
written with much input from the government of Canada, it probably reflects the views 
of  influential civil servants and politicians.
 22 The rationale for the existence of other temporary worker programs should also be re-
examined. While some, such as the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program, seem to be 
working as intended, others like the Live-in Caregiver Program have been subject to abuse. 
But again a detailed assessment of these programs is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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 1 specifying occupations for which temporary work visas are issued;
 2 excluding applicants likely to become a burden on the public health care sys-
tem and/or a threat to national security;
 3 setting up and supervising a privately run system for the collection of informa-
tion about the residence and work status of holders of temporary work visas;
 4 ensuring that those holding work visas follow the prescribed rules and enforc-
ing rules for deportation.23
Proposals in detail
The following set of recommendations fleshes out the basic ideas just pre-
sented. Of course, the “devil is in the details,” and many additional details 
would need to be worked out in actual legislation.
 1 The issuance of temporary work visas (WVs) for entry into Canada requires 
documentation proving that the applicant has a legitimate job offer from an 
employer in Canada and that the offer is for work specified in a list compiled 
and kept current by the government.
 2 Work visas will be issued by a Canadian embassy abroad for citizens of all 
countries other than the United States, who can obtain the visa at border 
points of entry.
 3 The work visa is valid for two years. It can be renewed for an unlimited num-
ber of times, for two years each time, upon presentation of evidence of con-
tinued employment.
 4 After four years in Canada and continued employment, the holders of WVs 
can obtain permanent immigrant visas. Landed immigrants will be eligible 
to apply for citizenship two years later.
 23 This raises the issue of the government’s ability to deport immigrants in Canada on WVs 
who do not comply with the terms of the visa. The government has been trying to deal 
with this issue in the case of refugees. Unless some reasonably expeditious way of remov-
ing foreigners from the country can be arrived at, it will be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to impose any system of border controls on the inflow of people from abroad. 
One possibility that has been put forward is the use of the “notwithstanding clause” in the 
immigration legislation to remove the full range of legal appeals right up to the Supreme 
Court guaranteed under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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 5 The spouses and dependents of the holders of WVs may enter Canada under a 
program of family work visas (FWVs), which allow them to accept employment.
 6 The holders of WVs who lose their jobs must find new employment within 
three months or leave Canada, unless the spouse is employed under the 
FWV provision.
 7 Investors and entrepreneurs who can document that they own at least $1 
million24 that they want to invest in Canada are eligible for investor work 
visas (IWVs) valid for two years, renewable biannually and allowing con-
version into immigrant visas after four years. Renewal of the IWV requires 
documentation that investments worth at least $1 million have been made in 
Canada and that the investor has filed Canadian income-tax returns. Failure 
to provide evidence of an investment means that the investor is required to 
leave Canada within three months of the determination.
The radicial aspect of the proposed temporary employment visa program is 
that it is designed to eliminate the existing need for government employees 
to make judgments about the eligibility of applicants for immigrant visas that 
are based on documents of questionable value that the applicants submit. It 
also eliminates the need for government employees to make judgments about 
whether an applicant has the personal characteristics to succeed economi-
cally in Canada. Instead, Canadian employers will make these judgments 
before they issue employment contracts, having properly evaluated the suit-
ability of the immigrants’ education, work experience, and language skills for 
success in the job.25 These employers are motivated by their own self-interest 
to make the right decisions as wrong decisions lead to financial losses and 
endanger the very existence of the employers’ enterprises. These financial 
losses could be reinforced by penalties for abusing the program, including 
prohibitions on sponsoring future WVs.
Government employees would, of course, still have to be involved in 
administering the program and checking to make sure that its requirements 
were satisfied. In this regard, it is worth noting that their performance in run-
ning the Temporary Foreign Worker Program has been less than exemplary 
according to the Auditor General (2009) and that many of the deficiencies 
she identified would also have to be remedied to make sure our proposal for 
WVs would function well and not run into the same problems.
 24 This figure needs to be indexed to inflation to assure that the real value of the investment 
continues to serve its purpose.
 25 In this regard, it is worth noting that immigrants are, at present, no longer selected by 
Citzenship and Immigration based on interviews. It is hard to imagine that any business 
would similiarly hire anyone without an interview.
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Some issues
Some discussion is needed around the specific parameters of our proposal 
before it could be finalized. For example, is the requirement that the loss of a 
job and failure to find a new one leads to repatriation after only three months 
too harsh and does it need to be longer? Will the high cost of travel make 
it difficult to have personal interviews with prospective employers and will 
potential foreign workers be able to use the informal labour market on which 
Canadian citizens rely considerably to find most of their jobs?
Discussion of these issues will undoubtedly bring up the fact that pri-
vate enterprise already has an effective global network for tapping into the 
international market for highly skilled and professional workers. There are 
conventions, informal contacts through professional associations, and old 
school ties. Under the proposed system, firms in specific industries facing 
shortages of workers with required skills can band together in hiring head-
hunters to find and evaluate potential candidates abroad. They can take advan-
tage of new technologies such as the internet, chat, and Skype to facilitate 
and reduce the costs of the interview process. Immigrants already in Canada 
represent an important informal link to job candidates abroad and can be 
used increasingly. The large numbers of foreigners who study in Canada’s 
institutions of higher learning are ready candidates for WV permits.
The experience with temporary work visas under the NAFTA treaty 
shows that labour markets can function reasonably well across borders. For 
instance, Pia Orrenius and Daniel Streitfeld conclude that “[t]he TN’s com-
bination of market-based efficiency and minimal red tape makes it a poten-
tial model for a type of guest-worker plan and a stepping stone toward a 
common NAFTA labor market” (2006: 1). The main criticism of the system 
has been that it is administered somewhat inconsistently, mainly because it 
gives too much discretion to US border officials to verify the employment 
contracts and qualifications of the applicant for the specific occupations and 
professions on the government list.26 Our proposal eliminates most of these 
problems since the WVs are to be issued by Canadian embassies abroad and 
specialized private agents must be involved in verifying the validity of job 
offers and occupational qualifications.
 26 Globerman (1999) described the system and evaluated it after it had been operating for a 
short time. Since the publication of this evealuation, Globerman has obtained much infor-
mation about the operational difficulties associated with the process. Suffice it to note that 
lawyers now offer their services to individuals who have job offers but are rejected by civil 
servants at the border for a variety of reasons, including inadequate documentation prov-
ing that the applicant has the educational and occupational qualifications to fill the job.
DeVoretz (2003) has shown that the rate of approval of applications differs greatly 
among different US points of entry and through time. These differences are attributed to 
the relatively loose criteria for determining whether a job offer is valid and educational 
qualifications acceptable, which leaves much discretion to individual staff at the border.
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In fiscal year 2009, the United States granted TN status to 62,690 
Canadians and 17,017 Mexicans under the NAFTA treaty, and also to individ-
uals residing in the United States who were presumably nationals of Canada 
and Mexico (US-DHS, 2010). These facts suggest that foreigners including 
those residing in Canada and Mexico have been able to find jobs in the United 
States using the available mechanisms. We may expect similar mechanisms 
to serve potential employees seeking work contracts in Canada. In addition, 
the United States has in place a system for admitting  under temporary work 
visas foreigners living in non-NAFTA countries. In the most recent fiscal 
year 2009, US Government Statistics (US Department of State, 2010) indi-
cate that 110,367 H-1B visas were issued for temporary workers with higher 
education in certain “specialty occupations” that involve the application of 
“highly specialized knowledge” (United States Code, 2010).
Our proposed system has one other important advantage over the 
present system. The annual inflow of immigrants will rise and fall with over-
all economic conditions during recessions and booms, rather than allowing 
immigrants to enter Canada at annual rates insensitive to economic condi-
tions and thereby exacerbating unemployment, as is the practice now.
Investor-class immigrants
Immigrants admitted to Canada under the investor-immigrant program have 
a poor record of meeting the objectives of the program, as is documented 
by Collacott (2003) and Francis (2002). There is strong evidence that the 
immigrants rarely spend their funds on projects providing employment for 
Canadians and that some have based their applications on claims to funds that 
they in fact borrowed for that purpose from Canadian sources. Our proposals 
would eliminate these and other shortcomings by requiring that the renew-
als of IWVs would be conditional upon the submission of documents show-
ing how the money has been invested and that the owner has filed personal 
and business income-tax returns. The details of the conditions for investors 
obviously need to be fleshed out with the help of experts and input from past 
foreign investors who entered Canada under the present provisions.
Family-class immigrants
One of the most controversial implications of our proposal is that Canada 
would no longer admit immigrants who under the present system would 
qualify under the family class. We justify this new policy on the grounds laid 
out in considerable detail earlier in this study—the demographic character-
istics of these immigrants make them unlikely to be economically successful 
in Canada, yet make them likely to make heavy use of the country’s social 
programs. Canada’s social, health care, and public pension systems are in 
financial trouble and cannot afford additional burdens through inappropri-
ate immigration policies.
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Under our proposal, people who come to Canada with temporary WVs 
will have done so with the full knowledge that they cannot sponsor for immi-
gration relatives other than their spouses and dependent children. If family 
ties are critical for these people, they have the choice of not coming to Canada 
on a temporary WV. The lack of the opportunity to sponsor family mem-
bers does not prevent those same family members from coming to Canada 
for temporary visits. It only precludes them from automatically qualifying 
for social benefits after their arrival, just as is the case with other temporary 
visitors from abroad.27 
Neither does the rule prevent immigrants in Canada from sending 
financial support to needy relatives abroad,28 nor from encouraging and help-
ing properly qualified relatives to find employment in Canada. Below we dis-
cuss a possible modification of our proposal concerning elderly parents and 
grandparents of immigrants under which their offspring settled in Canada 
could buy an annuity for them, which would ensure that their parents would 
receive an adequate flow of financial resources over their expected lifetimes, 
and thus allow them to be admitted to Canada.
A further justification for our proposed policy is that ironically, it can 
help maintain the coherence of traditional families abroad since it would 
help prevent parents and grandparents from leaving behind other mem-
bers of their extended families, especially large numbers of children and 
grandchildren, to join one or a few of their offspring in Canada. This has 
been the rationale used by Australia, under whose policy the parents and 
grandparents of economic immigrants are admitted only if at least half of 
their children are in Australia (or at least more are in Australia than in any 
other country). This requirement has been combined with the need to put 
into escrow a substantial sum to meet the financial needs of the parents 
and grandparents (Australia, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 
2011a, 2011b).
 27 We believe that such a set of regulations would not interfere with the judgment reached 
in the of the Supreme Court’s Singh decision, which specified that all Canadian residents 
are automatically entitled to the benefits from social programs, since not doing so would 
violate the non-discrimination clause of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The specific 
wording of the decision is: “… the Charter guarantees everyone … the right to life, lib-
erty, security of the person … The term ‘everyone’ includes everyone physically present 
in Canada … The term ‘security of the person’ encompasses freedom from … suffering” 
(Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 1985: s.7). Suffering can be the con-
sequence of being deprived on the benefits of social security.
 28 It should be noted that in many countries, the amount of goods and services that can be 
purchased with a Canadian dollar is worth much more than what such a dollar would buy 
for needy family members in Canada so that, in effect, the limited financial resources of 
Canadian immigrant families are likely to do more good for their extended families if the 
funds are sent abroad rather than used in Canada.
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The status of the dependants of those holding temporary WVs in 
Canada needs to be set out clearly and include a wide range of contingen-
cies, as in cases when the holder of the temporary work visa dies, is divorced, 
or is jailed for crimes or terrorist activities. There are issues surrounding the 
status of children when they reach the age of maturity. We will not attempt 
in this report to develop specific policies for these contingencies but we are 
certain that they can be made equitable and consistent with the basic prin-
ciples that underlie our proposals.
Taxation and eligibility for social benefits
Taxation of holders of temporary WVs and their eligibility for social benefits 
require detailed analysis. Here is a list of the most important issues and rec-
ommendations based on considerations of taxation fairness.
 1 Holders of WVs and IWVs pay all the same personal income, GST, and sales 
taxes and social insurance premiums as do Canadian citizens.
 2 Because of these tax payments, the holders of these visas are rightfully and 
automatically entitled to receive the same public health care and general 
welfare benefits as are available to Canadian taxpayers, including:
	 •	employment insurance
	 •	provincial welfare
	 •	health care
	 •	public pensions.
 3 Given the temporary status of the visas held by potential claimants and the 
regulation under which failure to remain employed results in deportation 
after three months, the eligibility for employment, welfare, and health care 
benefits is limited to three months.29
 4 The holders of WVs or FWVs contribute to the Canada Pension Plan (CPP and 
OAS) and acquire corresponding entitlements upon retirement in Canada 
or abroad.
Explanation of recommendations
The principles underlying our proposals are that holders of WVs and IWVs are 
treated like Canadians and that, on average, contributors to social insurance 
 29 Special rules have to be worked out to deal with situations where the spouse of a person 
in Canada under a temporary WV holds a job and pays taxes while employed under the 
FWV provisions. This and many other contingencies cannot be discussed here.
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programs should receive benefits equal to the value of their contributions. 
The temporary visa holders pay taxes and therefore are entitled to receive, 
according to their needs, public education, health care, welfare, Employment 
Insurance benefits, and public pensions for themselves and their dependants.
Enforcing the rules of the system
We propose that private firms carry out the certification, surveillance, and 
enforcement rules under a system that is often described as a public-private-
partnership (PPP). The government would set out precisely the responsibil-
ities and work to be carried out by the private firms and specify the amount 
of money it would pay for this work. Firms would be selected through a 
competitive process whereby they would offer payment to the government 
for the right to do the work under the specified conditions for output and 
compensation.
Private firms would be paid specified fees for certifying that employ-
ment contracts submitted to Canadian embassies are valid, economically 
sound, and offer work in specified occupations and professions. The govern-
ment would recover the money paid to the private firms by imposing charges 
on applicants for temporary visas and their employers. The level of fees paid 
and charges made would be determined through the competitive process 
the private firms would undertake to secure the work. For example, if the 
pay offered for the specified work were too low, no private firms would bid 
for it. The government would then raise the pay (and the fees on the immi-
grants and firms hiring them), until an equilibrium when the fees paid to the 
private firms would result in small positive bids for the right to carry on the 
operations required by the government.
Under this process in equilibrium, fees imposed on the visa applicants 
and their Canadian employers would be efficient and fair since they would 
cover the cost of the services they receive. The private firms providing the 
services would have to remain efficient since the right to carry out the busi-
ness would be reaffirmed periodically through open bidding in competition 
with other private firms interested in the business.
One aspect of the work of these private firms would be to inform law 
enforcement authorities when individuals and employers had violated the 
rules under which they hold WVs and employ foreigners. The extra workload 
imposed on the law-enforcement agencies to enforce the new immigration 
system would require extra financial resources from the government. The 
government would provide the funds from general revenues, as is the case 
with all the work of all law-enforcement agencies.
The proposed private-public-partnership for the delivery of traditional 
government services have worked well where they have been put into place 
and where the government has spelled out clearly what the private firms are 
expected to do in return for the payments they receive. Competition among 
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firms wanting such contracts provides incentives on the operating firms to 
meet all service requirements, especially since competitors not in the sys-
tem have strong incentives to watch over the fulfillment of the government-
imposed obligations.
The conditions imposed on the private firms by the government will 
specify the degree of diligence required to establish the genuineness of 
employment contracts, the maximum length allowed for the issue of such 
certificates, how current the information on residence and employment status 
of temporary visa holders has to be, and many other aspects of the services 
needed to make the proposed system work. Penalties would be imposed on 
the private firms if they do not meet the specified requirements on the basis 
of scales agreed upon in the contract with the government.
Policing the system
We propose including the following rules in the legislation regulating the sys-
tem of temporary work visas. These rules are aimed at reducing what is almost 
certainly going to be the most important and difficult problem: the disappear-
ance into the underground of those holding temporary WVs if they quit or 
lose their jobs and cannot find new ones within the stipulated three months.
 1 Within one month after arriving in Canada, the holders of WVs must regis-
ter with the proposed enforcement agencies, providing information about 
their place of residence and ways to contact them. This information must be 
kept current. Fines would be imposed on the enforcement agencies if cleri-
cal errors or any other forms of negligence lead to non-compliance with the 
government rules. Those deliberately flaunting the rules would be deported.
 2 Employers of temporary foreign workers must notify the authorities immedi-
ately when any of their workers is laid off, or within one week if any worker 
has failed to show up for work. Substantial fines would be payable for 
non-compliance.
 3 Those holding temporary WVs who were found in violation would have no 
right to apply for status as refugees, use the courts to launch appeals against 
the enforcement agency’s decision, or delay deportation.
The proposed institutions and law enforcement provisions are likely to receive 
much criticism from human-rights advocates on moral grounds and from 
immigration lawyers claiming that the laws are unfair and should not apply 
to their clients. Our response to such criticism is that the Government of 
Canada has the right to set and enforce rules governing immigration. When 
applicants accept the visas allowing them entry into Canada, they also 
accept simultaneously the obligations and consequences of this status. The 
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candidates enter into this contract voluntarily and they therefore should 
not be entitled to question the decisions made by the agencies charged with 
enforcing the system’s rules, provided, of course, that the decisions are indeed 
consistent with the rules.
The proposed system and its enforcement mechanism may reduce not 
only the poor average economic performance of recent immigrants and the 
high burden on taxpayers outlined above, but would also be useful in improv-
ing diplomatic relations with the United States. As is well known, our neigh-
bour to the south is very concerned with reducing the threat of terror attacks 
from abroad. Canada’s current immigration policy and visitor tracking sys-
tem is considered inadequate in the fight against terrorism, especially given 
the relative ease with which people and goods move into the United States 
through official border checkpoints and across the otherwise unguarded bor-
der (Moen and Collacott, 2008).
The United States currently uses a system for screening and track-
ing holders of all non-permanent visas that enter its territory from Canada. 
Our proposed system can readily be integrated into that of the United States 
at relatively low cost and respond in part to that country’s expectations of 
Canadian help in fighting terrorism. In our view, the proposed system and 
cooperation with US border authorities can help alleviate American concerns 
and avoid drastic measures, such as stricter controls on Canadian visitors and 
imports, that have been proposed by some US politicians and security experts.
Modifications of the proposed system
The new system for selecting immigrants to Canada presented above will 
evoke opposition from Canadians who think that the level of government 
involvement should be greater than it is under our proposal. In the follow-
ing, we anticipate some of the concerns that will give rise to the demand for 
greater government involvement. We will examine their validity and outline 
how the government can deal with the concerns while minimizing the loss 
of the benefits from the system we propose.
Problems with the list of occupations
The preparation of the list of occupations and professions that are eligible for 
temporary work visas is subject to several possible problems. The list may be 
made to serve the interests of certain industries and occupations rather than 
the public. This outcome can arise through lobbying and political influence 
peddling by the affected interests. We could easily have a situation where 
a government agency is captured by those who are regulated and made to 
serve their interests through decisions that restrict competition and protect 
other economic benefits.
More generally, it has proven to be very difficult to identify pending 
shortages of skills and occupations in the long run and to use government 
Immigration and the Canadian Welfare State 2011 / 35
www.fraserinstitute.org / Fraser Institute
incentives to alleviate them. By the time workers are induced to learn skills in 
short supply and have actually acquired them, the shortages often have dis-
appeared. In fact, past government policies have often aggravated temporary 
skills shortages and surpluses. For example, not so long ago, skills related to 
the computers and information technology were expected to be in short sup-
ply. The expected shortages never materialized and there is now instead a glut 
of workers with such skills. In the 1980s, Canadian medical school enrolments 
were reduced significantly in an effort to cut the cost of the public healthcare 
system. Twenty years later there was a serious shortage of physicians. 
Even with the best of intentions and intelligence, the following prob-
lems are likely to arise from the proposed selection process run by a govern-
ment agency:
 1 Cyclically sensitive industries like construction and natural resource extrac-
tion can have lower demands for labour than expected and the foreign work-
ers can end up being no longer needed by the time they have arrived in 
Canada.
 2 Administrative lags in the preparation of the list and actions based on it at 
embassies abroad leave strong demand for skilled workers unfilled for some 
time to the detriment of the economy.
 3 The overall immigration rate expressed as a percentage of the population or 
growth in the labour force can become too low, given the government’s pop-
ulation targets and other criteria.
Replacing the list by a minimum rate of pay
To deal with the problems arising from the creation and use of the list of 
occupations and skills, applicants for temporary work visas could instead be 
required to have employment contracts paying a specified minimum annual 
salary.30 One such minimum level could be equal to the mean or median 
income from work earned by Canadians in the region in which the immi-
grant will be employed. This would eliminate many of the jobs covered by the 
Temporary Foreign Worker Program, which could be better filled by lower-
skilled residents. Since the level of wages increases every year and is different 
for each province, it may desirable to build such factors into the legislation 
specifying the level.
 30 An example of the use of a minimum annual salary was provided by the United Kingdom 
Border Agency (2010) when it established as one of its exceptions to the interim limits it 
put on non-EU economic migration to the UK last November that only established staff 
earning more than £40,000 (US$63,500) per year were allowed to work in the UK for 
longer than 12 months.
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The approach requiring a minimum salary continues to achieve the 
main goals of the reforms proposed above. It retains the protection of low-
income earners that Canadian social policies are designed to help. It also 
protects taxpayers because workers with the stipulated income from their 
earnings pay taxes high enough, and demand few enough social services 
on average, that they do not impose a fiscal burden on Canadians. It also 
has an important advantage over the system using lists of approved occu-
pations and professions. If, at the given rate of pay, the number of immi-
grants is too few in light of changes in the labour market or a desire to reach 
a specified level of immigration to achieve other economic or social goals, 
the minimum salary can be adjusted downward to increase the number; 
or adjusted upward, if the number of immigrants is too large, subject, of 
course, to the essential proviso that it should not be set so low as to gener-
ate a net fiscal burden.
However, setting a minimum salary also has its disadvantages and risks. 
For one, setting the rate of pay is subject to political influence, which opens 
the door to special-interest groups influencing it for their own benefit. But 
this problem is not as great as is the selection of occupations and profes-
sions for the list because it involves only one parameter. This fact makes the 
process easy to understand and likely to attract the critical scrutiny of the 
media and public.
Moreover, it may be possible to legislate the setting of the minimum 
salary by making it a specified percentage of the average income of Canadians 
and modifications prompted by the deviation of actual immigration levels 
from a set target. To protect these functions from the risk of being manipu-
lated for short-run political gains, it is possible to require that all changes can 
be made only after approval by majority vote in Parliament.
Problem with seasonal and cyclical industries
In many seasonal and cyclical industries, such as construction, forestry, and 
mining, the demand for labour fluctuates greatly. Under our proposal, many 
foreign workers would come to Canada during the boom phase of a cycle. 
What will happen to them when the boom turns into a recession? Will they 
become a burden on our social programs?
First, most of the workers admitted could be expected to be in high-
wage industries that require high levels of education and skills. These types of 
workers tend to be much less vulnerable to cyclical downturns. And, while it 
is true that for many of those migrant workers in more cyclical industries the 
mandated departure could prove to be difficult, the prospect of this happen-
ing would be known when they accepted employment in Canada. Through 
their very actions they would reveal that they voluntarily prefer such condi-
tions to remaining in their home countries where they might be unemployed 
or earning much less than they do in Canada. Moreover, remember that 
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those holding temporary work visas would still be entitled to Employment 
Insurance benefits and to stay in Canada for three months (or possibly more, 
depending on the length of time put into the legislation) before having to 
return to their countries of origin. During this period, they would have an 
ample opportunity to find new jobs, especially if they really wanted to remain 
in Canada. They may be expected to show very high levels of wage flexibil-
ity, regional mobility, and willingness to learn new skills. Their eagerness to 
work should enable them to join the 20% of the Canadian labour forces that 
finds new jobs every year.
Problem with family-class immigrants
One of the most emotional issues in Canadian immigration policy has 
always involved immigrants in the family class. Those who fall under the 
laws guiding admission in this class are the siblings, parents, and grandpar-
ents of people who have come to Canada as so-called economic immigrants 
and their spouses (not to mention the relatives of other previous family-
class immigrants or refugees). In 2009, family-class immigrants made up 
22.1% of all immigrants who entered Canada that year. Those who were 
selected by the federal government on the basis of their occupational skills 
and other characteristics contributing to their economic success accounted 
for only 16.2%.31 
The argument in favour of allowing large numbers of family members 
to join their relatives in Canada is basically humanitarian. The cultivation of 
family ties and providing parents with financial support is an important part 
of the culture for many immigrants, especially those who in recent years have 
increasingly come from Asia. The departure of some of the family’s mem-
bers with the best economic prospects in their home countries leaves those 
remaining behind worse off and often suffering from poverty and poor social 
services. There is also the economic argument that, unless Canada allows the 
immigration of these family members, the pool of economic immigrants will 
be significantly reduced. As a result, less stringent economic criteria will have 
to be applied to attract the desired number of all immigrants, so their aver-
age level of economic success will be lowered.
The case against admitting family class immigrants is quite simple. 
Siblings often do not possess the qualities needed to become economic 
immigrants and are thus likely to become a burden on Canadian taxpay-
ers. Otherwise, they could have entered Canada as economic immigrants 
on their own merit. Parents and grandparents of necessity often become a 
burden on Canadian taxpayers. These people normally have only few years 
 31 This data is taken from Citizenship and Immigration, 2010: Permanent residents, Canada–
Permanent residents by category, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2009/
permanent/02.asp>.
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left to work and pay taxes before they leave the labour force and consume the 
large amounts of health care and other social services that Canada provides 
for the elderly. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions have ensured these 
immigrants receive these benefits as entitlements based on the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.
The official data on immigration shows that the humanitarian argu-
ment in favour of family-class immigrants has won and that the economic 
arguments against it have been ignored. Using family status to select immi-
grants has become a cornerstone of Canada’s policy. The proposed new sys-
tem for selecting immigrants eliminates this policy. It is easy to predict that 
many political battles will be fought over the merit of this aspect of the pro-
posed new system.
Families and other financial arrangements
If the elimination of the family class of immigrants implicit in our basic reform 
proposals presented above is politically impossible, we offer the following 
two alternative methods for reducing the taxpayers’ burden. The first of 
these is used in Australia, where immigrants must post a bond with a finan-
cial institution. The money in this fund can be used if the parents of immi-
grants in Australia require financial assistance, which otherwise the coun-
try’s social programs would provide. Unfortunately, this system has built-in 
perverse incentives: if the money is spent early and generously and runs out, 
the immigrants can rely on the existing social programs to support them 
(Australia, Dep’t of Immigration and Citizenship, 2011b).
A second method would require immigrants in Canada to purchase 
annuities, possibly with the help of funds provided by their parents and grand-
parents. These annuities would pay out annual benefits sufficient to take care 
of the normal needs of the parents over their expected lifetimes, including 
health care. The government would have to specify annual levels of payments 
to match normal needs. Private insurance companies will set the price of 
the annuities on the basis of actuarial estimates of life expectancies. As in 
the case of all such life annuities, savings to the insurance companies aris-
ing from deaths before the average life expectancy are matched by the extra 
costs of beneficiaries that live longer than the expected time. While the use 
of annuities to pay for the needs of sponsored parents and grandparents has 
not been tried anywhere, it addresses the basic problem directly and effect-
ively. It certainly warrants further study.
We are uncertain about the outcome of the political calculus, but it 
might help if the discussion of the issues considered the following facts:
 1 The proposed policies would not be retroactive. Immigrants who already have 
their parents and grandparents in Canada would not be affected.
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 2 Future immigrants could meet their traditional family obligations by trans-
ferring funds to their families remaining behind. Such remittances tend to 
provide their families with the ability to buy more goods and services than 
they could obtain if the same money was given to them and spent in Canada.
 3 Future immigrants could meet some of their traditional obligations towards 
their parents by having them come to Canada as temporary visitors.
 4 Future immigrants can travel to their native countries to cultivate traditional 
family ties.
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 6 Summary and conclusions
Canada’s existing immigrant-selection policies during the last 25 years have 
resulted in an inflow of immigrants that is very high by both historic and inter-
national standards. This inflow has significant implications for the economic 
well-being of Canadians as our population ages that needs to be addressed.
Recent census data used in the study reveals that immigrants who 
arrived in recent decades have average incomes that are only 72% of the aver-
age earned by all Canadians. This fact is important because under Canada’s 
welfare-state regime personal income tax rates are progressive and the immi-
grants with these low incomes on average pay only a little more than half what 
all Canadians pay. While these income and tax gaps narrow through time as 
immigrants adapt to life in Canada and integrate into the labour force, they 
will remain for at least 20 years and probably more.
The other aspect of Canada’s welfare state relevant to the analysis of 
the fiscal impact of current immigration policies on the economic well-being 
of Canadians is the universality of all social programs. Using government sta-
tistics on types of government spending, some data specific to the amounts 
consumed by immigrants, and informed assumptions about other types, we 
conclude that immigrants and all Canadians on average consume roughly the 
same value of government services. (And this puts aside the issue that recent 
immigrants are apt to qualify for greater benefits as they age and qualify for 
income-tested government pensions like OAS and GIS.) Putting together 
the facts that recent immigrants pay less than average taxes and consume 
similar values of government services as do all Canadians, we estimate that 
the fiscal cost imposed by immigrants on all Canadians was about $6,051 for 
fiscal year 2005/06. 
Depending on assumptions about the number of immigrants receiv-
ing this transfer, the total fiscal cost to the government of recent immigrants 
ranges from $16.3 billion to $23.6 billion annually. The precise size of this 
cost is not so important. What counts is that it is very substantial and can 
be expected to continue and to grow for as long as the present immigration 
policies remain in place.
We have evaluated arguments implying that these costs are accom-
panied by substantial economic benefits to Canadians that are not properly 
accounted for in our analysis. But we conclude that the benefits in the form 
of relief from unfunded liabilities of Canada’s social programs, the reduction 
in labour shortages, and others are either non-existent or too small to com-
pensate for the burden immigrants impose. We also note that recent immi-
grants have contributed to growing poverty as measured by the government’s 
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LICO index. This has important implications for economic and social policy. 
Poverty can make it more difficult for the children and grandchildren of immi-
grants to succeed economically and will thus tend to perpetuate itself.
We propose changes in Canada’s immigrant selection process that are 
not anti-immigrant, but are instead aimed at replacing the present failed 
system with one that uses market forces to select immigrants and thus to 
determine the level of annual inflows. The basic instrument proposed for the 
selection of immigrants is reliance on legitimate job offers issued by approved 
Canadian employers. This private system is to be supervised by the govern-
ment to ensure those immigrants’ earnings are high enough to prevent the 
imposition of fiscal burdens and that immigrants do not pose a risk to public 
health and safety. 
Now, at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, with Canada facing large cyclical deficits, we need to have a no-holds-
barred public discussion of proposals to reform the immigrant selection pro-
cedures. We need to resolve the problem soon because growing structural 
deficits are expected to emerge over the next few decades as a result of the 
aging of Canada’s population and the unfunded liabilities of Canada’s social 
programs. We cannot afford to add the growing fiscal burdens imposed by 
poorly selected immigrants to this toxic fiscal brew that is undermining the 
Canadian welfare state. Canada’s immigration system is badly broken and 
mere tinkering, as the government has been inclined to do, will not be enough 
to fix it. Nothing less than a totally new approach will do.
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